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In Broad Target Selection, there is collection 
of information by the terrorists on a large number 
of potential targets typically, through open source 
and general information collection. Stories from 
newspapers and other media are used as are Internet 
searches which provide pictures, blueprints, and 
video information.22  The number of preliminary 
targets that can be screened is limited only by the 
capabilities of the group to collect information from 
sympathizers and open sources.  The American Beef/
Cattle industry is a fairly quick target in the broad 
selection. “Beef. It’s What’s for Dinner,” proclaims the 
National Cattleman’s Beef Association, and American 
eating habits bear that out.  Government and industry 
figures estimate as many as 78 million meals including 
beef are served daily in the United States.23  
Targets that are considered vulnerable, and which 
would further the terrorist organization’s goals, are 
selected for the next step: Intelligence and Surveillance. 
In this step, the terrorists begin to eliminate possible 
successes and begin to focus on the most probable. 
This is one of the most important areas of information 
for attack site selection, since the intent is to bypass 
and avoid security measures. 
Agriculture has several characteristics that pose 
unique problems for managing the threat of terrorism. 
The disparate geographical distribution of unsecured 
agricultural production environments has generally 
received less attention than counter-terrorism and 
homeland security efforts.24  And yet, Americans still 
spent in excess of $175 billion at fast food restaurants 
in 2011, an increase of 3% from the previous year.25  If 
the livestock supply chain is disrupted, the impact on 
our society is mind boggling; not only would people 
not be able to purchase beef, but the cascading effects 
would be profound. Almost every employee within 
that $175 billion fast food industry would lose his 
 
22  A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, B-1.
23  Knickerbocker, Brad. “Mad Cow Weighs Down a $175 Billion Industry.” 
Christian Science Monitor. 05 January 2004. http://www.csmonitor.
com/2004/0105/p02s01-usgn.html, (accessed 11 March 2010).
24  Monke, Jim. Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness. CRS Report for 
Congress. 13 August 2004. http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/meta-
crs5731/m1/1/high_res_d/RL32521_2004Aug13.pdf, (Accessed 11 March 
2010).
25  Jargon, Julie. “Wendy’s Stages a Palace Coup.” Wall Street Journal. 21 
December 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203733
304577102972533796622.html, (accessed 11 March 2010).
or her job.  Shippers of beef would grind to a halt, 
meat packing plants would close, and suppliers of 
restaurant equipment and supplies would shut down.
With this intelligence, terrorists move to the 
next step: Specific Target Selection.  If the target is 
the American Beef/Cattle industry, where would 
one find lots of cattle? Naturally, the answer is in 
feedlots (pardon the pun).  How one would find 
out about feedlots merely requires a simple Google 
search of “feedlots and magazines” returns the result: 
www.FeedlotMagazine.com. Feedlot magazine tells a 
reader that it is a billion dollar industry (this serves 
to confirm the target selection) and that feedlots are 
concentrated in the Midwest. Another simple Google 
search of Midwest agricultural websites brings one 
to the Nebraska Department of Agriculture website, 
wherein there is a publication for Nebraska Cattle 
Feeders. The beef industry is the single largest in 
Nebraska, with over 1,940,000 cows in the state.26
This then advances planning to the next step: 
Pre-attack Surveillance and Planning.  Members of 
the actual operational cells would begin to appear 
during this phase.  Either trained intelligence and 
surveillance personnel or members of the terrorist cell 
trained for the operation usually conduct this phase. 
Consequently, the level of intelligence tradecraft and 
operational competency correspondingly increases. 
In this phase, terrorists gather information on the 
target’s current patterns over time, usually from days 
to weeks. It allows the attack team to confirm the 
information gathered from previous surveillance and 
reconnaissance activities. The areas of concern are 
essentially the same as in Phase II, but with greater 
focus based upon evaluating the planning conducted 
thus far.27  Using open source websites, specific targets 
were finalized, delivery methods were tested, and the 
type of weapon or attack was selected.
Because our enemies search for and use 
information that is available on the Web or from 
published sources, I will not provide details of the 
specific targets that were selected nor the criteria 
that were used to do so.  Likewise, I will not provide 
 
26  Nebraska Cattle Feeders Directory. Nebraska Department of Agriculture. 
http://www.agr.state.ne.us/cattle_feeders/index.html, (accessed 11 March 
2010).
27  A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, Appendix B.
 Consider the implications of a life without beef; 
no burgers, no tacos, no steaks. Now imagine all of 
the second order effects of life without any beef; no 
jobs for restaurant employees, no restaurants, no jobs 
for the industries that support restaurants, and no 
jobs for supermarket employees, or meat packers, or 
truckers… the list goes on and on.  The threat from 
terrorists on America’s livestock industry is real and 
yet most Americans do not even know it exists.  A 
simple Red Team exercise reveals the threat.
Red Teaming is the practice of viewing a problem 
from an adversary or competitor’s perspective, also 
known as alternative analysis. The goal of most Red 
Teams is to enhance decision making, either by 
specifying the adversary’s preferences and strategies or 
by simply acting as a devil’s advocate.15 Red Teaming 
serves many purposes, the greatest of which are 
exposing vulnerabilities and allowing for corrective 
action; ultimately it allows an organization to be 
proactive in deterring or defeating future threats. It 
is well known that terrorists follow a simple seven-
step planning cycle.  Walking through that planning 
cycle and using alternative analysis reveal the threat to 
America from agroterrorism. 
America is at war with terrorist enemies who are 
intent on attacking our homeland and destroying our 
way of life.16 As the national strategy to counter this 
threat has evolved over the past 23 years, the most 
 
15   Red Teaming definition. Glossary. RedTeamJournal.com, (accessed 11 
March 2010).
16  National Strategy for Homeland Security. (Homeland Security Council, 
October 2007), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=479633, (accessed 11 
March 2010), 1.
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glaring vulnerability which has not been protected or 
hardened is America’s agricultural industry. Aspirations 
of al-Qaeda have been revealed in clues recovered 
from abandoned safe houses and caves following 
their abandonment when U.S. troops invaded in 
the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. In addition 
to the cell phones and other operational supplies 
there were thousands of documents and computer 
records. Included in this trove of information were 
Arabic translations of several hundred pages of 
U.S. agricultural documents.17  One should not be 
astonished that al-Qaeda or any other determined 
terrorist organization would be imaginative enough to 
contemplate ways of attacking U.S. food industries. 
Indeed, a relevant article reminds its readers, “The 
history of warfare is full of examples of burned crops, 
poisoned wells, and slaughtered herds.”18
Due to the nature of asymmetrical warfare, terrorists 
must carefully plan their operations to minimize risk 
and maximize their potential for success.  Therefore, 
they must capitalize on their opponents’ weaknesses 
and circumvent their strengths.19 To that end, 
terrorist cells extensively survey potential targets and 
meticulously plan out operations, focusing particularly 
on the intelligence gathered from reconnaissance.20 
The planning cycle is valid for traditional hierarchically 
organized groups, as well as the decentralized “network” 
type organizations.21 The typical stages of planning a 
terrorist operation are as follows:  
I. Broad Target Selection
II. Intelligence and Surveillance
III. Specific Target Selection
IV. Pre-attack Surveillance and Planning
V. Attack Rehearsal
VI. Actions on the Objective
VII. Escape and Exploitation
17  Peters, Katherine. “Officials Fear Terrorist Attack on U.S. Food Sup-
ply.” Government Executive. June 2003. http://www.govexec.com/
defense/2003/06/officials-fear-terrorist-attack-on-us-food-supply/14278/, 
(accessed 11 March 2010).
18  Ibid.
19  A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. 15 August 
2005,TRADOC DCSINT No. 1. http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=457464, 
(accessed 11 March 2010), B-1.
20  Ibid.
21  Ibid.
The United States is exceedingly vulnerable to agricultural 
bioterrorism.  Abundant food supplies are taken for granted, 
and thus it is difficult for most Americans to imagine a 
world in which the availability of food radically changes. 
Yet a simple, unclassified, Red Team exercise reveals the 
real threat to our beef industry.  Steps can and must be 
taken to defend America against this threat.
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conviction of Aafia Siddiqui. Siddiqui, a 36-year-old 
Pakistani woman, resided in the United States for 
more than a decade (from 1991 until June 2002), and 
earned degrees from the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (B.S. in Biology) and Brandeis University 
(Ph.D. in Cognitive Neuroscience). She subsequently 
returned to the United States a mere six months later 
on 25 December 2002, then departed again on Jan. 
2, 2003.41  A few years later, Afghanistan National 
Police (ANP) officers observed Siddiqui outside the 
governor’s compound in the country’s Ghanzi Province 
on July 17, 2008.42 Regarding her as suspicious, the 
ANP officers then questioned her and searched her 
handbag.43 Their search produced several documents 
on the creation of explosives, as well as other notes 
that discussed various ways to attack “enemies,” 
including the use of underwater bombs, and gliders.44 
Siddiqui also possessed a computer thumb drive 
that contained correspondence referring to specific 
“cells,” “attacks” by certain “cells,” and “enemies.”45 
Additionally, Siddiqui was in possession of sealed 
substances contained within bottles and glass jars.46 
Washington has enacted laws, but not enough 
has changed to decrease the likelihood or potential 
for this type of terrorist attack to take place on U.S. 
soil.   We do not need more government; we need 
more vigilance.   Local communities in livestock 
producing areas need to be educated about the 
threat, and local law enforcement needs to be alert 
to preparatory acts even though many of them may 
not be criminal in and of themselves.  However, for 
years, local law enforcement has trained to be on 
the lookout for preparatory acts for crimes such as a 
conspiracy to commit a bank robbery, and those very 
same preparatory acts are investigated even though 
they are not criminal in and of themselves. Feedlot 
 
41  “Aafia Siddiqui Indicted for Attempting to Kill United States Nationals in 
Afghanistan and Six Additional Charges.” DOJ Press Release. 02 Sep-
tember 2008. http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/September/08-nsd-765.
html. (Accessed 11 March 2010).
42  “Aafia Siddiqui Arrested for Attempting to Kill United States Officers in 
Afghanistan.” DOJ Press Release. 04 August 2008. http://www.justice.
gov/opa/pr/2008/August/08-nsd-687.html, (accessed 11 March 2010).
43  Ibid.
44  Ibid.
45  Ibid.
46  Ibid.
owners also need to appreciate the threat, and while 
still being innovative, they should be encouraged to 
update their websites so that items such as wind speed, 
humidity, and other weather conditions are not open 
source.  While such local information is important to 
shippers, it can easily be relayed to truckers without 
being made available to potential terrorists.  Feedlot 
owners with lots next to major interstate highways or 
other roadways should also consider using inexpensive 
methods such as snow fences (as seen in Wyoming and 
Colorado) to block surveillance and foreign objects.   
Finally, local communities and local law enforcement 
should report and respond to all suspicious activities. 
Only by remaining ever vigilant can we disrupt 
the terrorist planning cycle and thwart operations.  
While the threat to America’s livestock industry is 
real, there are opportunities to be proactive against 
the threat to protect and maintain our way of life.  It 
is in this way that the United States can continue to 
remain the home of the brave and the land of  
the free.
details of the delivery methods selected because I 
refuse to provide a cookbook for someone who wishes 
to destroy our way of life.  Suffice it to say that the 
Red Team example had a high probability of success 
with both Actions on the Objective and Escape 
and Exploitation.  
I will, however, detail the type of weapon or 
attack selected: foot-and-mouth disease (FMD). If 
FMD were introduced in the United States via its 
unsecured farms, ranches, feedlots, etc., there would 
be no recourse but to institute the mass slaughter of 
millions of animals, in addition to the safe disposal 
of their infected carcasses.28 Such an event would 
likely halt or even cripple all sales, both domestic and 
international, of any U.S. meat products for months 
or even years.29  Research estimates extrapolated from 
the 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom 
project that the cost to taxpayers of such an attack on 
the U.S. industry could amount to as much as $60 
billion.30  Where did I come up with such a nefarious 
method of attack? From the very same official 
Nebraska publication mentioned previously, where it 
addresses “Welcoming International Visitors to Your 
Ranch” and “The Threat: Foot-and-Mouth Disease.”31
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is a highly virulent 
and contagious disease that manifests in the form of 
fever and blister-like lesions followed by consumption 
of the tongue, lips, mouth, teats, and hooves.32 FMD 
affects not only cattle and swine, but sheep, goats, deer, 
and other cloven-hoofed ruminants as well.33 There 
are seven known types and more than sixty subtypes 
of the FMD virus. Immunity to (or vaccination to) 
one type does not protect an animal against other 
permutations.34  Some people will counter with the 
fact that this country has been free of FMD since 
28  “Agroterrorism— Why We’re Not Ready: A Look at the Role of Law 
Enforcement.” NIJ Research for Policy. December 2006. www.nij.gov/
pubs-sum/214752.htm, (accessed 11 March 2010).
29  Ibid.
30  Ibid.
31  “Foot-and-Mouth Disease International Travel Information.” Nebraska 
Department of Agriculture. http://www.agr.ne.gov/animal/foot_mouth_dis-
ease_travel.html, (accessed 11 March 2010).
32  “Foot-and-Mouth Disease.” APHIS Factsheet. February 2007.  http://
www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/animal_health/content/printable_ver-
sion/fs_foot_mouth_disease07.pdf, (accessed 11 March 2010).
33    Ibid.
34  Ibid.
1929. While that fact is correct, it does not diminish 
the reality that we are facing an enemy who has both 
the desire and capability to carry out such an attack, 
nor does it diminish the fact that FMD has already 
been used successfully against another nation that had 
eradicated FMD for more than 60 years. 
The first report of an FMD outbreak occurred 
in March 1997, originating in Taiwan.35 This disease 
became an epidemic within six weeks and led directly 
to the extermination of eight million pigs. As a result, 
Taiwan’s pork exports ground to a halt.36  Reportedly, 
the FMD virus was carried by a pig that had been 
sent from Hong Kong, which served to reinforce 
the notion that China had conducted agroterrorism 
against the island nation.37 The economic aftermath 
resulted in the expenditure of $4 billion to exterminate 
the virus, in addition to the loss of $15 billion in 
“indirect losses from trade embargoes.38 The bottom 
line is that livestock animals in this country are also 
highly susceptible to FMD viruses. 
If an outbreak were to occur in the United States, 
this disease could spread rapidly to all sections of the 
country by routine livestock movements unless it were 
detected early and eradicated immediately.  If FMD 
were to spread unchecked, the economic impact could 
reach billions of dollars in the first year.39  In addition, 
deer and other susceptible wildlife populations could 
become infected and potentially serve as a source for 
re-infection of livestock. While vaccines for FMD are 
available, the vaccines must be matched to the specific 
type and subtype of virus causing the outbreak.40 
Therefore, the simplistic answer of “we will just 
vaccinate” is not so simple in practice.
One of the most frustrating aspects of Red 
Teaming is having the knowledge that the terrorists 
we face have both the motivation and the technical 
knowledge to handle contagious biological agents. A 
perfect open source example is the arrest, trial, and 
 
35  Parker, Henry. Agricultural Bioterrorism: A Federal Strategy to Meet the 
Threat. McNair Paper 65. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strat-
egy Studies, National Defense University, 2002), 14-15.
36  Ibid, 14-15.
37  Ibid, 14-15.
38  Ibid, 14-15.
39  “Foot-and-Mouth Disease.” APHIS Factsheet. 
40  Ibid.
